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15 European nuclear nationalism
UK and French perspectives on 
nuclear disarmament
Nick Ritchie and Benoit Pelopidas
The UK and France were the first sub- superpowers to develop nuclear 
forces after participating in the US Manhattan Project. Despite critiques in 
the two countries, the British and French decision- making elites never felt 
that a US pledge of extended nuclear deterrence could substitute for what 
they regarded as independent nuclear forces (Pelopidas 2015a). In both 
countries, the development of a nuclear arsenal coincided with the loss of 
a colonial Empire, the brutalizing impact of six years of “total war” against 
Nazi Germany, and the forging of an uncertain new world order. Both 
countries have justified the continued possession of nuclear weapons 
through reference to notions of “strict sufficiency” (French Government 
2008: 120, 168, author’s translation; French Government 2013: 73; Simon- 
Michel 2014a: 2) to meet evolving conceptions of “minimum deterrence” 
throughout the nuclear age. After the Cold War, both countries initiated 
modernization programs for their nuclear forces (French Government 
2008: 170) while at the same time reducing their numbers, which is now 
the general tendency across nuclear- armed states (Mecklin 2015). Since 
the Ottawa declaration of 1974,1 the two nations, both founding members 
of NATO, have argued that their nuclear forces contribute to the deter-
rent capacity of the Alliance (North Atlantic Council 1974: para 6; NATO 
2010: para 18). In 2010, the two countries signed a fifty- year treaty to 
develop and operate joint nuclear warhead diagnostic facilities in the UK 
and France, which cemented a nuclear- armed path dependency for both 
nations for the foreseeable future (Harries 2012). Beyond these common-
alities, France and the UK have had different approaches to the possibility 
of nuclear disarmament; these derive from the different post- Second 
World War national narratives in which the development of nuclear 
weapons has been embedded. This started from two different attitudes 
toward the NATO Alliance and its nuclear component, two different sets 
of lessons learned from the 1956 Suez crisis (Pelopidas 2015a), and it cul-
minated in two different reactions to the increase in nuclear disarmament 
advocacy worldwide, which is the focus of this chapter.
 The UK conducted its first nuclear test in 1952, becoming the third 
country to do so. In 1957, it entered the ranks of the thermonuclear 
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powers with the detonation of a 1.8 megaton shot off Christmas Island in 
the central Pacific. Three years later, in February 1960, France detonated 
its first A- bomb in the Algerian desert. In October 1964, the air com-
ponent of the French nuclear forces entered service and, in 1968, Paris 
detonated its first H- bomb. In 1971, the land- based component was final-
ized in Provence with eighteen silos built on the plateau d’Albion, where 
short- range Pluton and Hades missiles would be placed. In 1972, the first 
French ballistic missile submarine, Le redoutable, entered service. In the 
1990s, the land- based component of the French nuclear forces and the 
test site in the Pacific Ocean were dismantled.
 The UK currently has a nuclear stockpile of 225 warheads that arm its 
US- designed and built Trident II (D5) submarine- launched ballistic mis-
siles deployed aboard four Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines. The 
system is collectively referred to as “Trident,” which encompasses the mis-
siles, submarines, and warheads. The UK embarked on a long, expensive, 
and controversial project to replace the Trident system in 2007, beginning 
with the procurement of a new class of ballistic missile submarines.2 The 
intention is to retain a strategic nuclear weapons capability well into the 
second half of the twenty- first century after the new submarines enter into 
service in the 2020s and 2030s.
 The French arsenal is similarly expected to last for the next two to three 
decades at least, with the recent addition of modified nuclear- tipped air- 
to-air missiles (ASMPA) and the four French ballistic missile submarines 
that are being adapted to deploy the new M- 51 submarine- launched bal-
listic missiles, a new version of which is being developed. The French Pres-
ident has ordered preparatory studies for the third generation of ballistic 
missile submarines, the replacement of Mirage 2000N by Rafale, and the 
evolution of the ASMPA cruise missile, as well as the preparation of the 
successor generation, ASN4G, which are referred to in laws detailing 
the military programs for 2014–2019 (French Government 2014: 38).
 The UK decision to replace the Trident system was driven by a number 
of factors, notably the perceptions of strategic national security threats 
from nuclear- armed adversaries and an abiding belief in the efficacy of 
nuclear deterrence (what Booth and Wheeler (1992) call “nuclearism”).3 
Other factors include the importance of reproducing the “special relation-
ship” with the USA, industrial concerns about retaining a sovereign capa-
bility to build nuclear- powered submarines, and, perhaps most 
importantly, a particular elite conception of national identity in terms of 
who “we” think we are and how we think “we” should act in the inter-
national political arena. The latter reflects what Hennessy (2007a) labels a 
“gut instinct” that the UK should be and must remain a nuclear power.
 There is, however, resistance to “business- as-usual” for another genera-
tion of nuclear weaponry. This is reflected in deep disquiet within the UK 
government and among the general public about the necessity and 
wisdom of investing heavily in reproducing a strategic nuclear weapons 
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capability procured in a different era to deter an adversary that no longer 
exists, despite difficult relations with Russia over its annexation of Crimea 
in 2014 and the strategic destabilization of Ukraine. It is rooted in con-
cerns about cost in an era of welfare austerity and significant cuts in the 
defense budget. It reflects a different hierarchy of national security chal-
lenges in which nuclear weapons have little value, as well as a desire to 
support the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by taking significant 
steps toward nuclear disarmament (Ritchie 2012). This last point of resist-
ance was transformed by the resurgence of an international nuclear disar-
mament agenda in January 2007, just a month after the Labour 
government under Tony Blair published the White Paper The Future of the 
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent in December 2006, setting out the case 
for the replacement of Trident.
 Since the late 1970s, with the conversion of the French socialist party to 
nuclear deterrence and the progressive decline of the communist party, 
which similarly gave up criticizing nuclear deterrence, French officials 
have shown no similar discomfort with the possession of nuclear weapons 
by the Republic and no major governing party is opposed to a continued 
possession of nuclear weapons. The green parties oppose both nuclear 
weapons and nuclear power, which puts them at a political disadvantage 
in a national context in which more than 70 percent of electricity comes 
from nuclear sources. It would be false, however, to argue that there has 
not been any criticism of those weapons in France. Critical voices are 
simply left out of official circles (Pelopidas 2012, 2015b). For example, 
non- violent movements (religious or not), environmentalists, and military 
personnel willing to preserve the link between the army and the nation 
have formulated critiques for a long time. In 1964, the year when the first 
component of the French nuclear arsenal entered service, Georges Izard, 
a lawyer who would soon become a member of the Académie française, 
published his Lettre affligée au général de Gaulle [Afflicted letter to General 
de Gaulle] (Izard 1964), which summarized almost all the non- communist 
and non- moral critiques that are voiced today. The weapon system was 
described as: primarily dangerous due to the impossibility of protecting 
populations against a nuclear strike and the status of primary target 
granted by the possession of nuclear weapons; potentially useless and 
resulting from a misguided inability to accept that France was now a 
middle power; and, finally, too onerous. Izard (1964) suggested that, 
instead of accepting its status as a middle power, France used the bomb to 
compensate for the loss of both its empire and its rank among the nations 
of the world. In the military, a majority was opposed to a French A- bomb 
between the end of the Second World War and the Reggane test in 1960. 
Even before the test, several anti- nuclear traditions had made powerful 
cases against nuclear weapons. One opposed the nuclearization of the 
country in the name of the priority that should be given to the preserva-
tion of the empire. Others voiced a civic critique that nuclear weapons 
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were tantamount to a technocratic elite dispossessing the body politic of 
its control over its own defense and, as a consequence, citizens were likely 
to lose their sense of responsibility for the defense of the nation as they 
lost their sense of voluntary sacrifice for it. A third critique started with 
the latter assessment of a loss of responsibility and sense of sacrifice, but 
saw it as the source of a weakening of the population in the case of a 
conventional war.
Nuclear disarmament resurgent
In both the UK and France, the positive response to renewed advocacy in 
favor of a world without nuclear weapons was mostly based on a strategy of 
creating the conditions for nuclear disarmament rather than practicing it, 
even if the UK’s rhetorical commitment to the goal is less ambiguous than 
the French.
 In the UK, the Labour government responded to the powerful call by et 
al. (2007) for “a world free of nuclear weapons” by declaring its full com-
mitment to this aim and a determination to take an active leadership role 
in examining the practical steps and challenges involved. In June 2007, 
the UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett declared that, “When it comes 
to building this new impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want the 
UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work. To 
be, as it were, a ‘disarmament laboratory’ ” (Becket 2007). In January 2008, 
the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown pledged that the UK “. . . will be at 
the forefront of the international campaign to accelerate disarmament 
among possessor states, to prevent proliferation to new states, and to ulti-
mately achieve a world that is free from nuclear weapons” (Brown 2008). 
In February 2008, the UK Defense Secretary Des Browne gave a speech 
entitled “Laying the foundations for multilateral disarmament” at the Con-
ference on Disarmament in Geneva. He said, “. . . the UK has a vision of a 
world free of nuclear weapons and, in partnership with everyone who 
shares that ambition, we intend to make further progress toward this 
vision in the coming years.”
 In February 2009, the UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband published 
a policy information paper Lifting the Nuclear Shadow: Creating the Conditions 
for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, which said, “We need an assertive and 
cooperative strategy, founded on the premise that the goal of a nuclear 
weapons free world is achievable” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
2009: 3). The following month, Prime Minister Gordon Brown declared in 
a speech that the UK would develop “. . . a credible roadmap toward disar-
mament by all the nuclear weapons states – through measures that will 
command the confidence of all the non- nuclear weapons states” (Brown 
2009). The roadmap was published later that year (Cabinet Office 2009). 
The UK hosted a conference of the five recognized nuclear weapons states 
(the UK, France, China, Russia, and the USA) in September 2009 in 
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London to explore confidence- building measures toward nuclear disarma-
ment, the first conference of its kind. Follow- up meetings took place in 
Paris, Washington, and Geneva, and then again in London (Ritchie 2013).
 Outside the UK government, four former foreign and defense secretar-
ies, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen, Douglas Hurd, and George Robertson, 
mirrored their transatlantic colleagues with an article in The Times in June 
2008 that said the world must “[s]tart worrying and learn to ditch the 
bomb.” They argued:
Substantial progress towards a dramatic reduction in the world’s 
nuclear weapons is possible. The ultimate aspiration should be to have 
a world free of nuclear weapons. It will take time, but with political 
will and improvements in monitoring, the goal is achievable. We must 
act before it is too late, and we can begin by supporting the campaign 
in America for a non- nuclear weapons world.
(Rifkind et al. 2008)
Their call was endorsed by 277 MPs in a parliamentary Early Day Motion 
on the Nuclear Security Project the following month (Willett 2008).
 In the coalition government that came to power in 2010, the Conser-
vative Party’s pre- election Green Paper on National Security stated, “In the 
context of progress in nuclear disarmament and reduction, the UK must 
be prepared to take a rigorous look at whether we can take our excellent 
record in this area further forward” (Conservative Party 2009: 13). Conser-
vative MP David Lidington, later Minister for Europe at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, said:
. . . [the] party welcomes the specific proposals that have been put 
forward by Schultz, Kissinger, Perry and Nunn. . . . We agreed too with 
the long- term objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, though we 
think that the path to that goal is likely to be slow and painstaking.
(Lidington 2010)
Some changes to UK nuclear weapons policy were subsequently made in 
the Coalition’s Strategic Defence and Security Review published in 
October 2010 (Cabinet Office 2010). The review announced further 
reductions in the UK’s nuclear stockpile and an updated negative security 
assurance to non- nuclear weapons states party to the NPT.
 The Liberal Democrats, as the junior party in the Coalition, consistently 
supported the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons. They argued that 
the UK can and should take further steps “down the nuclear ladder”’ by 
cutting the nuclear force yet further and removing it from permanent 
alert (Liberal Democrats 2013; Ritchie 2009). To that end, in May 2011 
they successfully sought agreement with the Conservatives for a formal 
government review of alternative systems and postures to a like- for-like 
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replacement of Trident on permanent alert. The Trident Alternatives Review 
was released in declassified form in July 2013 (Cabinet Office 2013). It set 
out a range of alternative nuclear postures for the UK and applied these 
to a number of different delivery systems. The Liberal Democrats subse-
quently went into the 2015 General Election with a commitment to:
Retain our Trident independent nuclear deterrent through a Contin-
gency Posture of regular patrols, enabling a “surge” to armed patrols 
when the international security context makes this appropriate. This 
would enable us to reduce the UK warhead stockpile and procure 
fewer Vanguard successor submarines, and would help the UK to 
fulfill our nuclear non- proliferation treaty commitments.
(Liberal Democrats 2014: 75)
The French government was originally taken by surprise by the renewed 
advocacy of nuclear disarmament in 2007–2008. French officials, as well as 
most of the few French nuclear experts, remain convinced that this push 
is temporary, that the history of the nuclear age is that of nuclear prolifer-
ation, and that a world without nuclear weapons is in the end not desir-
able (Pelopidas 2012; De Champchesnel 2010; Tertrais 2007, 2009a, 
2009b, 2010, 2011). As a result, the goal of a world without nuclear 
weapons is almost never mentioned by high- level public officials in France. 
The February 2015 speech by French President Francois Hollande is an 
exception as he declared that France “. . . does not want to give up on the 
goal of disarmament itself, including that of nuclear disarmament” (Hol-
lande 2015, authors’ translation). In 2012, his election as President of the 
French Republic led some observers to anticipate a change in the French 
reluctance toward nuclear disarmament, mostly because he was the first 
left- wing president in seventeen years and that, in a context of austerity, 
the defense budget was expected to decrease. However, the incoming 
president had emphasized his continued attachment to French nuclear 
weapons during the presidential campaign and, once elected, made sure 
that the false impression would not last by choosing to embark on the 
most recent French ballistic missile submarine, Le Terrible, on July 4, 2012, 
only a few months after his inauguration. This is symbolically powerful as 
no French president had made such a visit since Valery Giscard d’Estaing 
in 1974. In February 2015, President Hollande clearly stated, “The inter-
national context does not allow any weakness and shows that the era of 
nuclear deterrence is not over” (Hollande 2015, authors’ translation). 
Consequently, we can mostly see continuity between the December 5, 2008 
letter by President Sarkozy to the United Nations Secretary- General Ban 
Ki- Moon about nuclear disarmament, while France was still assuming the 
rotating presidency of the European Union, and the later practice of Pres-
ident Hollande. The focus of the letter was on the goal of “a safer world” 
and on measures of arms control and transparency away from immediate 
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European nuclear nationalism  231
nuclear disarmament practice (Sarkozy 2008a). Similarly, Sarkozy had 
campaigned in 2007 on the idea of being “at odds” (“la rupture”) with his 
predecessors, but his nuclear weapons policy showed demonstrable con-
tinuity with the policy followed since the 1970s (Pelopidas 2012).
 However, the rise of nuclear disarmament advocacy has had a signi-
ficant impact on the former policy elites in France and triggered a limited 
debate in Parliament and among civil society. A 2012 report from the 
Working Group on the Future of French Nuclear Forces within the Com-
mission on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces of the Senate 
noted that:
. . . if we had to design a format of army today starting from scratch, it 
is very likely that the necessity to acquire a nuclear force de frappe, with 
two legs, would not be part of our ambitions for defense.
(French Senate Commission on Foreign Affairs, Defense and 
Armed Forces 2012)
This paragraph has had a significant impact, in particular on critical voices 
against nuclear weapons (Desportes 2014; Quilès et al. 2013: 92).
 Similar to the phenomenon described in the UK, groups mixing per-
sonalities from the right and left of the political spectrum have appeared 
in France and joined forces under the European Leadership Network 
headed by (now Lord) Des Browne. The only high- level government offi-
cial who has been publicly opposed to nuclear weapons for a long time is 
former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard. He participated in the 1996 
Canberra Commission and has since then been writing introductions and 
forewords to books trying to bring nuclear disarmament back into the 
French debate. In 1996, he wrote a long, partly autobiographical foreword 
to the French version of the report of the Canberra Commission (Rochard 
1996) and, in 2009, did the same for the critique of the illogic of the 
nuclear arms race by Le Guelte (Rochard 2009). In the spring of 2015, he 
wrote the foreword to the French translation of disarmament advocate 
Ward Wilson’s book Five Myths about Nuclear Weapons (Rocard 2015). As he 
himself confessed in December 2013, he had been preaching alone in the 
desert for a long time (Pascallon 2015). However, starting in the late 
2000s, a French “gang of four” gathered around him (Rocard, Juppé, 
Richard, and Norlain) and published an article in the French newspaper 
Le Monde (Rocard et al. 2009). General Bernard Norlain is a former dir-
ector of the Institute for National Defense Studies and was head of the 
military cabinet for the French Prime Ministers Michel Rocard and 
Jacques Chirac; Alain Juppé is a former French Prime Minister and Alain 
Richard is a former Defence Minister. Since then, Alain Richard and Alain 
Juppé have stayed away from nuclear disarmament advocacy, but former 
Defence Ministers Paul Quilès (1985–1986) and Herve Morin (2007–2010) 
have become vocal about the issue. Quilès created an association Arrêter 
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la bombe [Stop the bomb], along with General Norlain and defense 
analyst and the French representative of Parliamentarians for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Jean- Marie Collin, and later published 
two books on the issue (Quilès 2012; Quilès et al. 2013). A few prominent 
scientists and public intellectuals joined the discussion, including physicist 
Albert Jacquard and former diplomat Stephane Hessel (Hessel and Jac-
quard 2012) and, in a context of austerity, a few military voices advocated 
the dismantlement of the air leg of the French arsenal, or at least the 
opening of a serious debate about it (Desportes 2013, 2015). In spite of 
these differences, we examine in the next section how the political leader-
ships in the UK and France have maintained a commitment to nuclear 
weapons.
UK and French commitment to nuclear weapons
The formal UK response to the global zero initiative sparked by Shultz et 
al. (2007) and cemented by US President Barack Obama’s speech in 
Prague in April 2009 (Obama 2009) was generally positive. The validity of 
a world free of nuclear weapons was accepted and a desire to be at the 
forefront of developments among the nuclear weapons states was strong, 
particularly for Labour and the Liberal Democrats.
 Nevertheless, the legitimacy of UK nuclear weapons and the practice 
of nuclear deterrence have not been questioned in Whitehall (Ministry of 
Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2006: 17). None of 
the main Westminster political parties is committed to relinquishing 
nuclear weapons. All are committed to replacing Trident in some form 
and retaining nuclear weapons well into the future, with the Conservatives 
and Labour committed to a like- for-like replacement of the current system 
(Coaker 2014; Hansard 2010; Hammond 2013). Anything less than such 
“essential protection” risks fatally undermining the nation’s security, they 
argue (Robertson et al. 2013). The debate led by the Liberal Democrats 
over possible alternatives is about the more limited aim of rethinking 
nuclear deterrence to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, while 
retaining the capability to deploy them within a specific period of time 
should a major military threat to the survival of the state ever re- emerge. 
Successive UK governments have acknowledged that the UK currently 
faces no major direct nuclear threat and has not faced such a threat since 
the early 1990s (Cabinet Office 2008: 12). “Unilateralism” remains a dirty 
word in Westminster after Labour’s sojourn into the political wilderness in 
the 1980s, partly as a result of its electorally unpopular platform of nuclear 
disarmament (Stott 2006).
 What we have witnessed, then, is an aspirational, but conditional, rhe-
torical commitment to the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons. The 
commitment is one of working to “create the conditions” for a “step- by-
step” approach to nuclear disarmament through multilateral negotiations 
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between the nuclear- armed states (Cabinet Office 2010: 37). In this 
context, the UK insists that now is not the time for it to get rid of its own 
nuclear weapons, but to forge ahead with the Trident replacement 
program. Nuclear weapons are judged to provide a vital insurance against 
an uncertain future. In fact, necessity and insurance in the face of uncer-
tainty is the central theme of contemporary UK nuclear weapons policy. It 
is a mantra that was developed under Tony Blair and adopted by David 
Cameron, who has repeatedly asserted that UK nuclear weapons are “. . . 
the ultimate insurance policy against blackmail or attack by other coun-
tries. That is why I believe it is right to maintain and replace it [Trident]” 
(Hansard 2011) and that “Trident and its replacement are non- negotiable. 
They are an absolutely vital part of this nation’s security” (Hansard 2015). 
The UK will therefore retain its weapons for as long as other states possess 
them and until there is “. . . global adherence to obligations not to prolifer-
ate nuclear weapons or related technology, under the NPT and other 
treaties and export control regimes” (Ministry of Defence and the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office 2006: 15). Furthermore, the UK will only con-
sider entering a multilateral nuclear disarmament process after further 
significant nuclear force reductions by the US and Russia. For example, 
Alistair Burt, Parliamentary Under- Secretary of State at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, said:
In order for the UK to offer to include its small number of nuclear 
weapons in multilateral disarmament negotiations there would first 
need to be further reductions in the much larger nuclear weapons 
stockpiles held by other states and greater assurances that no new 
major threats will emerge that could threaten the UK or its vital 
interests.
(Hansard 2013)
 Significant qualitative changes in UK nuclear weapons policy to comple-
ment its post- Cold War quantitative force reductions have also been fiercely 
resisted, such as proposals to de- alert the nuclear arsenal advocated by the 
Liberal Democrats (Miller et al. 2012). Instead, the marker of the UK’s 
commitment to nuclear disarmament has been periodic “salami slicing” of 
the UK nuclear arsenal. While force reductions are clearly to be wel-
comed, an exclusive focus on quantitative reductions has sidelined inter-
national expectations of the much wider and deeper qualitative changes 
required to meet Article VI disarmament commitments under the NPT 
(Ritchie 2014).
 Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of the global zero agenda with the initi-
ation of the Trident replacement process gave some presentational prob-
lems for the UK. There is an evident diplomatic tension between 
commencing the Trident replacement program underpinned by an 
enduring commitment to the logic of nuclear deterrence and remaining a 
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firm supporter of the logic of nuclear disarmament in the NPT. The UK 
has been criticized in the NPT, along with other nuclear weapons states, 
for the continued modernization of its nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems because they reinforce the value of nuclear weapons and the prac-
tice of nuclear deterrence (Minty 2007). This has made it difficult for the 
UK government to credibly support a universal norm against nuclear pro-
liferation while insisting that it needs these weapons for its own security 
for the foreseeable future, particularly when the UK faces no strategic 
nuclear threat (Ritchie 2007). As Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency Mohammed El Baradei said in February 2007, the 
UK cannot “. . . modernize its Trident submarines and then tell everyone 
else that nuclear weapons are not needed in the future” (Blair 2007). This 
criticism has also been leveled at home. Writing in The Times in January 
2009, three former senior military figures, Field Marshal Lord Bramall, 
General Lord Ramsbotham, and General Sir Hugh Beach, argued, “The 
UK does not need a nuclear deterrent” and that:
. . . it is difficult to see how the UK can exert any leadership and influ-
ence on this issue [nuclear disarmament] if we insist on a costly suc-
cessor to Trident that would not only preserve our own nuclear- power 
status well into the second half of this century but might actively 
encourage others to believe that nuclear weapons were still, somehow, 
vital to the secure defence of self- respecting nations.
(Bramall et al. 2009)
The UK has attempted to manage the tension between the two by pursuing 
a nuclear posture of “minimum deterrence” and demonstrating political 
leadership on nuclear disarmament. This has required extensive discursive 
labor to legitimize the long- term retention of nuclear weapons through the 
expensive recapitalization of Trident system while framing the UK as a 
nuclear disarmament champion. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review, for 
example, described this as “. . . retain[ing] our nuclear deterrent with fewer 
warheads to meet our twin challenges of minimum credible deterrence 
backed by a firm commitment to arms control” and “. . . work[ing] to create 
conditions in which even a minimum level of nuclear deterrence is no 
longer necessary” (Ministry of Defence 1998: paras 8 and 55). Colin Gray 
described it as “. . . running with the nuclear fox and riding with the disar-
mament hounds” (Gray 2001: 233). So far, however, the commitment to 
nuclear deterrence has prevailed to the extent that a like- for-like replace-
ment of Trident remains the path of least political, financial, and opera-
tional resistance in Whitehall. Replacing the Trident system is perfectly 
legitimate under the NPT as far as the UK is concerned (Browne 2007; Min-
istry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2006: 14).
 France’s more steadfast defense of nuclear deterrence creates a more 
limited presentational problem than that observed in the UK even if, as 
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suggested earlier, President Hollande inscribed his defense policy within a 
framework in which nuclear disarmament remains a long- term possibility. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the size of the French nuclear forces has 
diminished significantly to less than 300 warheads and France still wants to 
appear at the forefront of progress toward a safer world while renewing its 
commitment to nuclear weapons.
 After 1995, France stopped nuclear testing, signed and ratified the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and started advocating its entry into 
force. By 1998, the Mururoa test site in the Pacific, the fissile material pro-
duction facilities, and the land- based component of the nuclear forces had 
been dismantled; the number of ballistic missile submarines permanently 
at sea was reduced to one and the level of alert of the French nuclear 
forces was reduced twice. Following the announcement by President 
Sarkozy in 2008 (Sarkozy 2008b), the size of the air leg of the French 
nuclear forces has been reduced by one- third. During the 2014 Prepara-
tory Committee to the NPT Review Conference, the French Ambassador 
announced that he would sign the protocol to the Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone Treaty in Central Asia and that France was also prepared to sign the 
protocol to the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty 
(Simon- Michel 2014a, 2014b). Those accomplishments coexist with the 
modernization of the arsenal outlined above (Journé 2011: 131–138).
 The two dynamics are articulated via the invocation of an unpredictable 
and dangerous post- Cold War international context in which nuclear 
weapons remain the ultimate guarantor of French “vital interests,” both in 
presidential speeches and in the White Paper on Defence and National 
Security (French Government 1994: 52; 2008: 69, 315; 2013: 127). The 
latest instance can be found in Hollande (2015). Already in the military 
realm in 1994, the preservation of nuclear deterrence was conceived 
within the framework of “. . . less immediate risks than before, more diffuse 
and varied risks, but persisting ones or maybe increasing ones in the fore-
seeable period” (French Government 1994: 57, authors’ translation). The 
2008 White Paper reuses this motif of an increasingly dangerous and 
unpredictable world (French Government 2008: 11, 14, 300, 315) in which 
nuclear weapons need to be maintained and modernized. This unpredict-
ability opens the possibility of strategic surprises and technological break-
throughs. In such a context, the reliance on an air- based component and 
not only on a submarine- based nuclear force is presented as protecting 
“. . . our deterrence against [. . .] an unexpected technological break-
through in the fields of air defense, missile defense or submarine detec-
tion (French Government 2008: 169–170, authors’ translation). Here we 
can see similar justificatory narratives in the UK and France rooted in 
uncertainty, necessity, and insurance metaphors.
 Most importantly, in France, nuclear disarmament is never isolated 
from conventional disarmament and the broader security context (Sarkozy 
2008a, 2008b; Simon- Michel 2014a, 2014b: 3; Hollande 2015). As a result, 
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disarmament is portrayed as a multilateral and incremental process toward 
general and complete disarmament and, while France keeps talking about 
“. . . exerting its responsibilities when it comes to disarmament” (Simon- 
Michel 2014a, 2014b), the framework in which this is supposed to be done 
is within the Permanent 5 process, where the focus is on transparency in 
the number of warheads and verification. Transparency is then presented 
as necessary to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament and as a 
sign of French progressive policies in that matter, but it is also compatible 
with classic policies of arms control and deterrence (Hollande 2015; 
Simon- Michel 2014b). From the French official perspective, “. . . the next 
logical step of multilateral disarmament” is the negotiation of a Fissile 
Material Cut- Off Treaty within the Conference on Disarmament (Simon- 
Michel 2014a: 3, authors’ translation). In the end, a world without nuclear 
weapons is simply not the end goal; the consistent end goal from the 
French official perspective remains “. . . a safer world for all and to create 
the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” (Simon- Michel 
2014a: 4, authors’ translation) which fundamentally relies on nuclear 
deterrence in the face of an uncertain future.
 The French attachment to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence is 
also visible in the boundaries of what is publicly debated on the issue in 
France, within the very limited space this debates occupies (see Pelopidas 
2015a). Both the pro- and anti- nuclear deterrence camps accept the fact 
that nuclear deterrence is technologically driven and that there is a “. . . 
preeminence of technology over doctrine” (Quilès et al. 2013: 14). While 
the opponents are trying to use this fact as a critique, the pro- nuclear 
weapons camp regards it as a reality of the sector. Even the former 
commander- in-chief of the French Oceanic Strategic Force recognized 
this (Desportes 2014, 2015; Pascallon 2015). This does not mean that 
France will deploy any nuclear technology, but, as a result, modernization 
and technological developments never have to be justified by a strategic or 
doctrinal purpose; they become acceptable as determinants of the national 
arsenal. Moreover, the limited French debate is not really about nuclear 
deterrence. It is rather a debate in the name of nuclear deterrence. In 
spite of the context of austerity, the law defining military programs for 
2014–2019, as well as the presidential speeches, emphasize the need for 
both legs of the French nuclear arsenal to perform its mission of deter-
rence credibly. In the name of their perpetuation, modernization is pre-
sented as necessary (Hollande 2015; French Government 2014). To clarify 
that the debate on the possibility of limiting the mission of nuclear deter-
rence to submarines would not have consequences in the next electoral 
cycle, French Minister of Defense Jean- Yves Le Drian opened a conference 
in November 2014 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the French Air 
Strategic Force and restate its continued relevance (Le Drian 2014).
 Overall, political elites in the UK and France remain committed to nuclear 
weapons and, in spite of their diverging degree of public commitment to the 
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goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, both use similar rhetorical strat-
egies to negotiate the tensions between the long- term goal of abolition 
and the continued need for nuclear weapons. In both countries, the policy 
goal is not to disarm, but to create the conditions for nuclear disarma-
ment; while nuclear weapons keep being portrayed as an insurance against 
the unforeseeable, minimum deterrence or strict sufficiency are presented 
as signs that both countries are ahead of others as far as nuclear disarma-
ment is concerned.
Identity and fear
The UK’s desire to play a global leadership role in nuclear disarmament 
and retain nuclear weapons as a major power, highlights the significance 
of identity in nuclear politics. In fact, the “ontological insecurity” (Mitzen 
2006) generated by the prospect of becoming a nuclear weaponless state is 
a core driver of the UK’s determination to replace Trident. This is 
reflected in the party political fear of a partisan attack by the right- wing 
press for being “weak” on defense if a radical change in UK nuclear 
weapons policy is pursued. For many, a decision to become a non- nuclear 
weapons state by not replacing Trident would signal a dramatic downgrad-
ing of the UK’s “rank” in the international hierarchy of states (Willet 
2007). The Conservative Mayor of London Boris Johnson declared in Feb-
ruary 2015:
If a Labour–Scottish National Party coalition were to junk Trident, 
Britain would be vulnerable to nuclear blackmail; but it is worse than 
that. We would suffer a public and visible diminution of global author-
ity; we would be sending a signal that we no longer wished to be taken 
seriously; that we were perfectly happy to abandon our seat on the UN 
Security Council to some suit from Brussels; that we were becoming a 
kind of military capon.
(Johnson 2015)
The possession of nuclear weapons has been an important part of the 
UK’s identity in international politics since the late 1940s. Throughout the 
Cold War this “nuclear” identity centered on Britain’s wider self- identity as 
a major world power, the USA’s primary political and military ally, and a 
vital part of the Western bulwark against the Soviet ideological and military 
threat. The Soviet Union has long since been consigned to history and no 
major strategic nuclear threat has emerged to take its place, but the UK’s 
identity as a major power remains firm and the historical association in the 
UK between major “powerdom” and the possession of nuclear weaponry 
remains equally strong. As Mark Smith argued in 2005, underneath the 
many rationalist justifications for the UK’s possession of nuclear weapons 
lies “. . . a deeper sense that Britain ought to possess nuclear weapons as 
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part of the currency of being a major power” (Smith 2005: 449). From the 
mid- 1990s, Tony Blair and later Gordon Brown reproduced this identity 
within a New Labour framework and renewed the long- standing associ-
ation between Britain’s identity as a major power and its possession of 
nuclear weapons. The coalition government has continued this theme and 
reproduced a post- Cold War identity of the UK as a responsible nuclear 
power deploying purely defensive and therefore benign nuclear arms in 
support of international peace and stability.
 The possession of nuclear weapons reaffirms and, in part, constitutes 
the collectively held identity of the UK as an interventionist, “pivotal” 
power and defender of the international community operating alongside 
the USA through NATO. It reflects a historical narrative originating in the 
initial acquisition of a nuclear capability and chronicled in detail by Hen-
nessy (2007b). It is a powerful collective identity, the reproduction of 
which generates a “national interest” in the continued deployment of stra-
tegic nuclear weapons. In essence, if we want to be “the UK” according to 
this collective identity, then we must have nuclear weapons both as a 
representation of our major power identity and as a means of enabling the 
UK to act in the world according to this identity. This association suggests 
an implicit axiom that the UK is a nuclear weapons state both in fact and 
in identity (Ritchie 2012: chapter 5).
 This was evidenced in the debate on the referendum on Scottish inde-
pendence held in September 2014. The Scottish government, led by the 
Scottish National Party (SNP) has long insisted that “. . . an independent 
Scotland would be a nuclear free Scotland. The UK’s nuclear submarines 
would have to be removed from Scottish waters, encouraging the UK, we 
hope, to end its dangerous reliance on an outdated nuclear deterrent” 
(Scottish National Party 2005). In 2012, the SNP’s then- leader Alex Salmond 
insisted that a nuclear weapon- free status would be written into a new consti-
tution for an independent Scotland and this was set out in the Scottish gov-
ernment’s draft constitution published in June 2014 (Johnson 2012; Scottish 
Government 2014: 6). The SNP intended to remove Trident by 2020 within 
the first parliament of an independent Scotland after a general election in 
May 2016, twenty months after a successful independence referendum 
(Carrell 2013; Scottish National Party 2014). This caused deep anxiety for 
the Westminster political and defense establishment in terms of the UK’s 
capacity to engage in expeditionary warfare, its “special”’ relationship with 
Washington, the retention of a sophisticated nuclear arsenal, and the future 
of its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (Blick 
and Whitman 2013: 7–8). Former NATO Secretary- General and Labour 
Defence Secretary, Lord George Robertson alarmingly claimed in April 
2014 that Scottish independence would leave the UK as:
. . . a diminished country whose global position would be open to ques-
tion. . . . The loudest cheers for the breakup of Britain would be from 
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our adversaries and from our enemies. For the second military power 
in the West to shatter this year would be cataclysmic in geopolitical 
terms. . . . The force of darkness would simply love it
(Robertson 2014)
Vice- Admiral John McAnally similarly insisted in March 2014 that:
. . . our relationship with the United States, our status as a leading 
military power and even our permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council would all probably be lost. We would be reduced to 
two struggling nations on Europe’s periphery.
(Graham 2014)
Similarly, the possession of nuclear weapons has been a significant part of 
the post- Second World War French national identity, which combines an 
attachment to nuclear power and to nuclear weapons (Pelopidas 2012; 
Hecht 1998). This attachment is connected to the image of a protective 
and responsible world power.
 Beyond claims of adaptation of the doctrine and the capabilities 
(Bentégeat 2014), nuclear weapons have remained central as a response 
to the fear of a loss of independence, security, sovereignty, and freedom of 
action. The four White Papers on Defense, then the White Papers on 
Defense and National Security published since the creation of French stra-
tegic nuclear forces (in 1972, 1994, 2008, and 2013) show this eloquently. 
While the attempt at nuclear blackmail by the Soviets and abandonment 
by the USA during the Suez crisis is interpreted in the UK as meaning 
that, from that moment on, no major intervention abroad would be pos-
sible without consultation with the USA, the French remember it as the 
founding episode justifying a quest for independence via nuclear weapons 
(Pelopidas 2015b; Heuser 1998: chapter 3). We are not claiming that the 
Suez crisis changed the priorities toward the development of nuclear 
weapons, but instead that its memory retrospectively legitimized the 
course of action already taken in Paris.
 Being a nuclear weapons state was a significant part of French anti- 
hegemonic policies and the refusal of the bipolar order during the Cold 
War (for a typical example, see de Gaulle’s discussion with US Ambassador 
James Gavin on May 26, 1962; French Government 1962). It has largely 
persisted after the end of the so- called bipolar order. The 2013 White 
Paper states that “France’s strategy has evolved over time. In the 1972 
White Paper, its chief focus was nuclear deterrence” (French Government 
2013: 67). Twenty- two years later, after the end of the Cold War, “. . . the 
need to possess nuclear weapons in the new strategic context remains polit-
ically a major component of the independence of France” (French Govern-
ment 1994: 57, authors’ translation). The idea is restated and reinforced in 
the 2008 White Paper, which portrays nuclear weapons as instruments of 
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deterrence which serve as “. . . the ultimate guarantor of national security 
and independence” (French Government 2008: 69, 315, authors’ trans-
lation 315). Five years later, the meaning is stable, “. . . nuclear deterrence is 
the ultimate guarantee of the security, protection and independence of the 
Nation” (French Government 2013: 73). In the post- Cold War context, 
independence is still defined vis- à-vis NATO (French Government 1994: 37; 
2008: 110, 317, authors’ translation; 2013: 20) and vis- à-vis any other actor 
that that would restrict France’s freedom of action. The 2013 White Paper 
on defense and national security states that nuclear deterrence “. . . rules 
out any threat of blackmail that might paralyze [France’s] freedom of deci-
sion and action” (French Government 2013: 67). The emphasis was similar 
five years earlier: nuclear deterrence “. . . is one of the conditions of our 
strategic autonomy, and of the freedom of judgment, decision and action 
of the Head of State” (French Government 2008: 69, authors’ translation). 
“Nuclear blackmail” was similarly considered as “plausible” in the 1994 
White Paper (French Government 1994: 67, authors’ translation) and 
freedom of action was to be pursued at least in part with nuclear weapons 
(French Government 1994: 52).
 This freedom of action has to do with the ability of France to exert its 
responsibility as a world power. In the post- Cold War context, this is notably 
portrayed as an ability to protect its allies. “By its mere existence, French 
nuclear deterrence [. . .] contributes to Europe’s security” (French Govern-
ment 2008: 70, authors’ translation). The 2008 White Paper on defense and 
national security adds, within the discussion of France’s independence and 
freedom of action that, “. . . the Ottawa declaration and the 1999 strategic 
concept, which recognize the contribution of its forces [. . .] to the deterrent 
capability of the alliance” (French Government 2008: 110, authors’ trans-
lation). In 2013, the idea of a protective relationship vis- à-vis the European 
and NATO allies as a result of the possession of nuclear weapons is restated 
in almost equivalent terms: “France’s deterrence capability contributes by its 
very existence to the security of the Atlantic Alliance and that of Europe” 
(French Government 2013: 72). Indeed, the focus on freedom of action is 
explicitly linked to and constrained by “. . . the framework of [France’s] 
international responsibilities” (French Government 2013: 73).
 Pressure to disarm unilaterally in the context of the Trident replacement 
process, the Global Zero agenda, and the Scottish independence referen-
dum presented a major ontological challenge for the UK political elite. This 
took a new twist after the 2010 NPT Review Conference through the emer-
gence of a “humanitarian initiative” to delegitimize the use and possession 
of nuclear weapons based on the unmanageable and unacceptable human-
itarian consequences of use (Borrie and Caughley 2013). This process has at 
the time of writing involved three major international conferences on the 
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Oslo, Norway (March 2013), 
Nayarit, Mexico (February 2014), and Vienna, Austria (December 2014). 
The UK declined to attend the first two conferences, but it did attend the 
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Vienna conference, where it rejected the idea of a humanitarian imperative 
to ban nuclear weapons: “The UK considers that this approach fails to take 
account of, and therefore jeopardizes, the stability and security which 
nuclear weapons can help to ensure” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
2014). France did not send representatives to any of the conferences on the 
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Its statements during the 
NPT review process emphasized the need for a step- by-step multilateral 
approach to nuclear disarmament that recognizes the NPT review process 
as the only legitimate framework in which nuclear disarmament progress 
can be made. “Recent initiatives” calling for more urgent action on nuclear 
disarmament are accused of being counter- productive because they chal-
lenge the legitimacy of this framework (Simon- Michel 2014b). France main-
tains that its nuclear disarmament record is exemplary and includes such 
statement in the latest White Paper on defense and national security:
Since dismantling its nuclear testing site in the Pacific, France has con-
tinued to set an example by taking unilateral measures, such as the 
irreversible dismantling of its installations for producing fissile mater-
ials for nuclear weapons. It has indicated that its arsenal includes 
fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. France was the first country to take 
these concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament.
(French Government 2013: 73)
The political authority of the humanitarian initiative rests on a world view 
that privileges human security, the international rule of law, including 
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, human 
rights, and a conception of common humanity that underpins rationales 
for the “responsibility to protect.” The humanitarian focus exacerbates the 
tension between French and UK identities as a stalwart supporter and 
defender of these facets of international politics or protective states on the 
one hand, and states prepared to inflict massive nuclear damage in the 
name of their own national security on the other. Both the UK and France 
routinely self- identify as a “force for good” on the international stage and, 
in doing so, they conflate responsible and civilized state behavior with 
nuclear defense of the post- Second World War international order. The 
Global Zero agenda and the humanitarian initiative have challenged this 
conflation and set the reproduction by the UK and France of a strategic 
nuclear capability for another generation against the image of responsible 
statehood in terms of their own value commitments.
Opportunities for the UK
The Global Zero agenda provided an opportunity for the UK to exercise 
international leadership by exploring further steps toward a world free of 
nuclear weapons, but keeping its own nuclear arsenal as part of Margaret 
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Beckett’s “disarmament laboratory” concept (Beckett 2007). Yet Whitehall 
has chosen not to do so in any significant way for a variety of reasons, not 
least the politics of nuclear identity outlined in this chapter. The oppor-
tunity presented in the context of the Trident replacement debate is to 
rethink “minimum deterrence” by further reducing both the size and 
operational readiness of the UK’s nuclear weapons or by relinquishing 
nuclear weapons altogether. On the former, the UK could adopt the “pre-
served deterrence” option outlined in the Trident Alternatives Review 
(Cabinet Office 2013). This was described as:
No deterrent platforms would be regularly deployed but the UK would 
maintain the ability to deploy if the context changed. The platforms 
might be deployed without nuclear weapons for training purposes and 
could conduct conventional duties as long as they could be made 
available for deterrent duties if required.
(Cabinet Office 2013: 5)
In such a circumstance, the UK would become what William Walker 
describes as a “disarmament threshold state” with a fully de- alerted nuclear 
arsenal (Walker 2010: 447).
 Such a move would clearly indicate that the UK no longer sees a com-
pelling reason to deploy nuclear weapons for immediate use, but is tem-
porarily retaining these weapons pending global elimination. A de- alerted 
posture would all but eliminate any intention to use nuclear weapons first 
in a crisis at short notice, thereby reinforcing political and legal commit-
ments to non- nuclear weapons states and providing a degree of strategic 
reassurance to other possessors of nuclear weapons. It would signify an 
important “de- coupling” (Brown 1997: 47) of nuclear weapons from the 
broad, day- to-day calculus of national security by demonstrating that the 
UK is prepared to learn to live without nuclear weapons operationally 
deployed at sea on a permanent basis as a precursor to learning to live 
without nuclear weapons at all.
 The UK could, of course, go a step further and relinquish nuclear 
weapons altogether. This would represent the most significant case of “de- 
proliferation” to date and a potential turning point in the global nuclear 
order (Müller and Schmidt 2010). The decision would be of special signif-
icance for a number of reasons. First, the development of nuclear weapons 
originated in London when the Maud Committee first met in 1940 to con-
sider the practicality of a uranium atom bomb, three years before UK sci-
entists arrived at Los Alamos in New Mexico to build the first atomic 
bombs under the Manhattan Project. Second, the UK is a depository state 
of the NPT along with the USA and Russia. Third, the UK is one of the 
original members of the “nuclear club”. Finally, such a decision would 
unambiguously signal the declining utility of nuclear weapons for a still- 
powerful, influential, and activist country and would represent a clean 
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break between the pernicious correlation between a nuclear capability and 
permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (the UK 
would not lose its seat – it would have to vote itself off to do that) (Walker 
2007: 167). General Jack Sheehan, former Supreme Allied Commander, 
Atlantic for NATO and Commander- in-Chief, US Atlantic Command, con-
curred in January 2009, arguing, “I think it is entirely possible that the 
British government, for a lot of good reasons, could do it [relinquish 
nuclear weapons] and it would lead the world” and have a significant 
international impact (Sheehan 2009). Others, such as former UK Defence 
Secretary Liam Fox, have argued that other states would be “utterly under-
whelmed by gesture unilateralism” (Hansard 2007).
 If the UK continues with business- as-usual, however, the prospects for 
significant progress toward nuclear disarmament begins to look bleak as 
observers ponder the practicability of a world without nuclear weapons, if 
even a self- styled “reluctant” possessor of nuclear weapons operating at 
“minimum” nuclear posture cannot make a decision to radically rethink 
its commitment to nuclear deterrence when the strategic rationales for 
retention are so thin, the opportunity costs for the armed forces are signi-
ficant, public opinion is ambivalent or hostile to the replacement 
program, and the commitment to the NPT and a desire to exercise leader-
ship on nuclear disarmament is strong. This has been compounded by 
efforts to revalidate UK nuclear weapons following Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and the strategic destabilization of Ukraine. The UK then- Defence 
Secretary Philip Hammond, for example, stated in March 2014 that, “What 
those events do show is that we have been right throughout in maintaining 
the need to continue with a strategic nuclear deterrent as the ultimate 
guarantor of Britain’s sovereignty and freedom of action” (Hansard 2014; 
for a convincing critique of the counter- facts that a nuclear- armed Ukraine 
would prevent the Russian annexation of Crimea, see Rublee 2015).
 For now, at least, the UK stands at a crossroads. As the WMD Commis-
sion’s report Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Chemical and Bio-
logical Arms noted:
France and the UK will have to decide whether it will be meaningful 
to retain costly nuclear arsenals that were developed for an enemy that 
no longer exists, in order to meet hypothetical threats against which 
such weapons are of questionable value. Both countries are now at a 
crossroads: going down one road would show their conviction that 
nuclear weapons are not necessary for their security, while the other 
would demonstrate to all other states a belief that these weapons con-
tinue to be indispensable.
(Blix 2006: 90)
The tension between a firm policy of non- proliferation, as expressed by the 
firm attitude of the French toward Iran (Pelopidas 2012), and a continued 
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commitment to a small nuclear arsenal as the ultimate guarantor of national 
security and independence, which is presented as good value for money and 
relatively risk- free, is also at the heart of the French stance. The usual reac-
tion is to justify the French policy of strict sufficiency by contrasting it with 
the US–Soviet nuclear arms race and overkill. Nevertheless, the tension 
remains strong when we consider that the countries suspected of proliferat-
ing will not take the USA as an example, but might rather refer to the 
French anti- hegemonic nuclear politics of the 1950s and 1960s. The absence 
of debate of this issue in France is also more of a problem than in the UK, 
but, in both cases, nuclear vulnerability is at best imperfectly recognized; the 
public is not presented with consistent justifications of the reasons to con-
tinue nuclear vulnerability and any relationship between their continued 
possession of nuclear weapons and sustaining a permissive global environ-
ment for nuclear proliferation is vehemently denied.4
Notes
1 UK strategic forces were formally committed to NATO in the 1962 Nassau 
Agreement that paved the way for the Polaris Sales Agreement.
2 The government’s case was set out in detail by the Ministry of Defence and 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2006).
3 The notion that nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence are an 
inevitable, necessary, and enduring component of major power stability.
4 For this problem in the UK, see Pelopidas and Weldes (2014).
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